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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces the concept of ‘pop-up governance’ as a way of conceptualising the 
practice-based, flexible and localised governance mechanisms that emerged in response 
to the migrant reception crisis at the south-east borders of the European Union (EU) 
between 2015 and 2017. With the escalation of the war in Syria, the number of people 
seeking to enter the EU from Turkey increased significantly during 2015. The EU 
responded by introducing the ‘hotspot approach’ to managing unauthorised migration. 
We propose the notion of ‘pop-up governance’ to describe the spatially bounded and 
allegedly temporary set of international governance practices that constitute the local 
implementation of the hotspot approach on the Greek island of Lesbos. The notion was 
born out of the empirical findings of [Project Title], the two-year ethnographic research 
project we conducted on Lesbos as part of our [Funder name]-funded research grant 
[Project title and Funder name and programme withheld for Peer Review]. More broadly, 
we argue that pop-up governance helps re-conceptualise governance as a set of practices 
that neither adhere to predefined rules nor constitute an exception, but instead develop or 
regress according to perceived demand. In this way, the paper helps advance our spatial 
and temporal understanding of governance: a crucial task at a time of ephemeral yet 
consecutive and heavily geographically clustered social and political crises.  
Our four-strong team stayed repeatedly on Lesbos between September 2015 and 
December 2017, including five long-term stays and a series of briefer visits. During this 
time we conducted an ethnography of the hotspot approach. We visited key sites 
including migrant arrival points, registration centres, clinics and administrative HQs; 
recorded approximately two-hundred hours of ethnographic observation; interviewed 
thirty-six key actors including local community stakeholders, local and Greek 
government officials, EU and NGO representatives, and solidarity activists; and we 
analysed secondary data including European Commission and Greek government policy 
documents. We also produced a brief ethnographic film and mapped the hotspot approach 
in the broader EU context in the first research monograph dedicated to the issue [Authors, 
2019]. 
Section 2 traces the evolution of the EU migration management regime. Its latest 
phase, marked by the European Commission’s hotspot approach to migration 
management in emergencies, was consolidated following the EU-Turkey Statement of 
March 2016 . Section 3 then outlines our key fieldwork findings, which show the 1
1 The EU–Turkey Statement (also known as the EU-Turkey Deal) was reached on 18 March 2016 and 
implemented two days later. It was intended to limit the mass arrival of migrants to Greece through Turkey. 
A key aspect was the return to Turkey of all migrants found to have entered the EU illicitly. The EU agreed 
to resettle, on a one-for-one basis, Syrians living in Turkey who had qualified for asylum and EU 
resettlement. The EU further incentivised Turkey with a promise of lessening EU visa restrictions for its 
citizens and by offering roughly €6 billion to the Turkish government in order for it to finance projects for 
Syrian refugees. 
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workings of the hotspot approach. The logic of the hotspot, we argue, enacts border 
enforcement, but at the same time draws on securitisation and on the rationale of 
humanitarian emergency aid response. This logic gave birth to a particular kind of pop-up 
governance, and we use the following two sections to highlight the role of 
humanitarianism (section 5) and security (section 6) in the process. We conclude by 
calling for a re-evaluation of the role of seemingly ephemeral or geographically limited 
practices of governance in studies sitting at the intersection of migration, 
humanitarianism and security. 
  
2. EU migration management leading to, and in the age of the ‘hotspot approach’ 
Historically, European border policies have developed through mechanisms and 
practices―mostly invisible to the wider public―concerned with managing unauthorised 
mobility and avoiding mass transiting populations (Huysmans, 2000). Although today 
most refugees and other migrants are outside Europe, the continent has historically been 
central to the governance of international mobility. Indeed, the term ‘refugee’ originates 
from French Protestants escaping persecution in seventeenth-century France and seeking 
refuge elsewhere in Europe. In the early twentieth century, the first international 
arrangements to manage and support refugees were inaugurated with the League of 
Nations assisting hundreds of thousands of Russian ‘White emigrés’, who were fleeing 
the Bolshevik revolution. The second World War produced a new wave of involuntary 
mass population movement and displacement, prompting the fledgling United Nations to 
establish first the International Refugee Organisation and then, in 1951, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
The main multilateral agreement governing international population mobility has 
been the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, whose remit extends only to 
those meeting their strict ‘refugee’ definition. The management and regulation of the 
movement of other migrants has been left largely to the governments of individual nation 
states. The main exception is in Europe, where the 1985 Schengen agreement led to a 
reduction in border controls. Later on, the ‘Schengen area’ of border- and visa-free travel 
extended to 26 European countries through arrangements incorporated into the 1999 
Treaty of Amsterdam. 
From that year on the EU has also developed a Common European and Asylum 
System (CEAS), which became fully operational in 2015. Among other provisions, the 
CEAS includes the Dublin regulation, which stipulates that asylum claims should 
normally be processed in the country of first entry to the EU. Another key component of 
European mobility governance is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 
Frontex, whose role was upgraded in response to the migration events of 2015. Finally, 
the European Asylum Support Office is the EU agency responsible for supporting the 
implementation of the CEAS on the ground, including through training, 
capacity-building, and providing emergency support to EU member states subject to 
particular pressures on their asylum or reception systems. Since 1985, then, there has 
been a gradual, if often uneven Europeanisation of the governance of mobility within and 
across Europe’s external borders. This leads up to the establishment of the hotspot 
approach to managing the ‘exceptional flows’ of 2015. 
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The hotspot approach is both an evolution and culmination of European migration 
management policies, but it is also a policy fit for its time: a time when national and 
international policies swiftly adapt to new realities formed at equal speed by globalisation 
and neoliberalism, whether at the urban level (Harvey 2007), everyday living spaces 
(Brenner and Theodore 2010) or the world around us at large (Peck and Theodore 2016). 
In this era of expulsions (Sassen 2014) human migration and its management emerges as 
key in the future relationship between those who govern and those who are governed. In 
Europe, the Mediterranean and its islands have emerged as the most visible part of the 
EU border regime. Here, these practices have become part of a logistical operation 
(Pollozek and Pasoth 2019) all the while manufacturing emergencies, spectacularising 
enforcement, and intensifying detention practices (Campesi 2014, De Genova 2016).  
The hotspot approach was marketed as the principal response to the European 
migrant reception crisis. It was jointly introduced by the European Commissioner for 
Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship and the Greek administration. The approach 
was inaugurated at the Moria Reception and Identification Centre on Lesbos in October 
2015, which coincided with our second visit to the island. In a matter of a few hours we 
witnessed the premises at Moria—a former military base—being transformed: they now 
looked ordered, clean, in a state of readiness. A parade of national and international 
journalists followed the officials. But behind camera-friendly, cheerful scenes, a major 
structural transformation was playing out. 
The core strategy behind the hotspot approach is discussed in the European 
Agenda of Migration Management (2015) and subsequent European Commission 
communications (2015, 2016). Border enforcement at sea remained a key component, but 
was now to be accompanied by systematic identification and registration , as well as the 
completion of asylum procedures on the spot, before individuals move on. Conceptually, 
the hotspot approach was designed as a pressure regulator aiming at decelerating 
mobility. As a regulatory mechanism, the hotspot approach has a delegating function. It 
involves the hosting by a member state (in this case, Greece) of all relevant European 
agencies at the territorial border of the EU in order to bolster inter-agency cooperation 
and to centralize control over the external border. Once an area is declared a hotspot, the 
European Asylum Support Office, Frontex, Europol  and Eurojust  come in to assist the 2 3
member state to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants (European 
Commission, 2015). The intention is that the four agencies will support member state 
authorities with registration, identification and removal of apprehended migrants 
(Frontex); the registration of asylum claims and preparation of relocation claimants 
(European Asylum Support Office); and the investigation and subsequent prosecution of 
crimes (Europol and Eurojust). 
While Lesbos was declared a hotspot in October 2015, it was not until the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey statement in late March 2016 that we came to see the 
key aspects of this strategy in practice. Up to that point, the hotspot had been “more of a 
concept, an idea, less of an actual policy”, as a top-level EU official on the island, who 
wished to remain anonymous, told us. But in March 2016 Moria received a total facelift 
2 ​EU agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
3 EU judicial cooperation unit 
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and turned overnight into a pre-removal detention centre for failed applicants. Those who 
had arrived before March 20 were swiftly moved to the Greek mainland and subjected to 
regular (pre-hotspot) asylum procedures. Anyone arriving after this date was barred from 
leaving the island and was obliged to apply for asylum at the hotspot premises, using a 
new fast-track border procedure. This included a so-called ‘one for one’ mechanism: for 
every Syrian returned to Turkey, one would be resettled from Turkey to the EU―a 
resettlement supposedly matched by the speedy distribution of appropriate funds. It 
quickly became evident to us, and to officials and international NGO representatives on 
the island, that the implementation of the hotspot was going to be a messy affair. 
Overnight policy changes, chaotic and often clashing directives, and a glaring inability to 
implement these on the ground meant that previous conventions and 
guarantees―including the EU ​acquis​ (the rights and obligations of member states that 
arise from EU membership)​―​were now in great danger. 
 
3. Pop-up governance in Lesbos: some ethnographic reflections 
“At some point in early August 2015, there were over 100,000 people in the town of 
Mytilene  alone” recalls a key aide to the Mayor and the municipality’s main 4
communications strategist at the time. Pointing at the port area from where he was sitting 
for our interview, two months later, he described with full arm gestures the space covered 
by summer camping tents, then escorted our gaze to Sapfous square and finished by 
pointing to the steps of municipality building: “we had refugees sitting on these steps, 
even moving into people’s gardens; we handed out water and food, we wanted to make 
sure the situation did not get out of hand”. We began our fieldwork during that period, in 
the summer of 2015, in the middle of what he called the “biggest welcome operation in 
recent European history, and the biggest challenge we have ever faced as a local 
authority”. Traffic from the Turkish coast had increased considerably during the hottest 
summer months, when seas are calmer and the daylight lingers on. Boats would land at 
different areas on the island’s coast, with most of them washed onto its northern shores, 
where the distance from Turkey is shortest. One of the immediate challenges faced by 
local authorities at the time was registering new arrivals. “We engaged the police to 
perform registration and identification on the spot”, he explains. As we witnessed 
ourselves during those first months, this meant that the police handed out plain A4 sheets 
of paper and asked those arriving to fill in their name and country of origin. The sheet 
was then to be presented to the port authorities to secure a ticket to mainland Greece. 
This was a temporary solution improvised by local authorities to keep the situation under 
control. It was the first such impromptu initiative that we witnessed, but not the last. 
If we are to locate the inaugural moment for a more systematic, yet still 
improvised approach to the governance of migrants arriving at the Aegean Islands we 
need to go a little bit back in time. Greece’s 2010 Action Plan for Migration Management 
effectively transposed the EU’s 2008 Return Directive into Greek practice 
(Triandafyllidou 2010), as the fixation with deportations and Dublin returns guided 
policy development around borders and asylum at the time. ‘Screening centres’ were 
established in border zones and the First Reception Service was legally established (Law 
4 ​Capital and main port of Lesbos. 
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3907/2011 of the Greek state), setting out the relevant identification and registration 
procedures. These centres were intended as sorting terminals, effectively separating those 
who were considered potential asylum seekers from others. The infrastructure and human 
resources required for setting up the First Reception Service (FRS) were put together 
with delays while the vast majority of those entering illicitly were to be subsequently 
transferred to nearby detention facilities. In practice, the non-implementation of returns 
and delays in screening resulted in a significant proliferation of detention facilities  and 5
prolonged administrative detention particularly around borders (Karyotis 2012). In April 
2013 the Ministry of Citizen Protection, the government body responsible for borders and 
asylum at the time, introduced two Mobile Units (MD 11.1/1460) to reinforce registration 
and identification procedures. However, without being able to hire personnel , the FRS 6
remained understaffed. The project carried on with a handful of police officers while 
most of the operational activities involved in migrant screening, such as medical and 
interpretation services, were implemented via a state–third sector partnership model ​. In 7
essence, apart from fingerprinting, all other screening operations were left to 
subcontracted partners. According to one of our respondents with an employment 
affiliation to the FRS, when the numbers started picking up in February 2015, there was 
only one police officer registering 600 people per day on average. In addition to the 
Mobile Units, identification and registration ordinarily took place at the so called ‘First 
Reception Centres’ for digital fingerprinting, as required by the EU’s EURODAC 
regulation.  8
Back on Lesbos, with such meagre reception mechanisms put in place and given 
the profile of the incoming population in 2015-2016,  ​ the ensuing interpretation of the 9
government’s humanitarian obligations led to the establishment of an ad hoc two-tier 
registration system. As we witnessed ourselves, this two-tier system differentiated 
between those holding Syrian nationality and everyone else: the former received a 
six-month suspension from removal while the rest were issued a deportation order 
instructing them to leave the country within thirty days. When asked about this 
differentiation in the issuing of removal orders, our respondent, an aide to the Ministry 
5 For a more detailed map of Greece’s closed camps and detention facilities please refer to: 
http://en.closethecamps.org/country/GRC  
6 The country’s first bail-out agreement restricts significantly any new hirings of civil servants. This refers 
to the rules that were set as part of Greece's financial rescue agreement with the European Central Bank and 
the IMF. For more information please see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf  
7 As has been the case with Greece’s Reception and Accommodation Service activities which has been 
supported by the European Refugee Fund until its recent incorporation to the EU’s Asylum and Migration 
Fund, activities related to the FRS were subcontracted to two local NGO’s. Although FRS service activities 
were largely funded by the External Border Fund (see Grant Agreement for the FRS Mobile Units: 
‘​https://diavgeia.gov.gr/decision/view/%CE%92%CE%99%CE%97%CE%94%CE%99-%CE%9C%CE%9
53​’ The document is in English) additional donors, such as Norway, have been historically implicated to 
the running of FRS (see project description available at: 
http://eeagrants.org/project-portal/project/GR06-0001​) 
8 ​EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) is the EU’s fingerprint database for asylum seekers. EURODAC is 
an essential instrument of the Dublin regulation, intended to ensure that asylum applications are processed 
by the EU country of first arrival. 
9 UNHCR estimated at the time that around 60% of the incoming population fitted the profile of refugees. 
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for Migration Policy, explained that its legal basis was “indisputable” and related it to 
Greece’s obligations under International Humanitarian Law. The same explanation was 
also given during our interviews and discussions with UNHCR protection staff on Lesbos 
and in Athens.  For much of 2015 the removal orders effectively functioned as “transit 10
passes” (Franck 2017), allowing newcomers to move onwards to the mainland and the 
rest of Europe by presenting their registration document to authorities at the northern 
border of Greece with Macedonia. On Lesbos, the distinction practically resulted in 
multiple registration points where individuals were handled differentially according to 
nationality and protection category. 
This differentiation was designed ad hoc, to fit and to try and remedy the chaotic 
conditions described above. The distinction between Syrians and non-Syrians was not 
based on any legal framework whatsoever. Nevertheless, the large number of arrivals 
meant that the police, local and national authorities felt they had to find a way to interpret 
their legal obligations. With dozens of boats carrying hundreds of people arriving every 
day on the northern shores of Lesbos, the need to identify and register everyone was 
paramount for the authorities. Yet so was the intention to keep these new arrivals moving. 
In this sense, these impromptu removal orders emerged from the conditions on the 
ground. They popped up as a governance tool to secure the fastest possible transit of 
those arriving towards the rest of Europe. 
What we observed was a type of governance improvising its responses to a new 
situation, which had in turn been framed as an emergency. This new form of governance 
stemmed from the hotspot approach and functioned both as a magnifier and a corrector of 
perceived managerial failures and deficiencies. Greece’s alleged failure on border 
controls, for example, was magnified by said proclaimed emergency. This alleged failure 
was in turn directly linked to the country’s perceived lack of capacity to correctly identify 
and register arriving migrants. As our informant from the Ministry for Migration Policy 
explained, the pressure on Greek police to halt the practice of ink fingerprinting and 
switch to digital machines was so strong that it resulted in an obsession around 
registration processes. The digital fingerprinting of those arriving was highlighted by 
virtually all our interviewees from within public authorities. They all framed it as an 
absolute prerequisite of efficient border control. 
In the time that we spent on the island, we witnessed the governance of migration 
as this was being improvised, hastily implemented, revoked at will, and drawn and 
redrawn in seemingly random and often conflicting steps. In short, the picture from the 
field was one of chaos: administrations and authorities operating beyond capacity, under 
budget, and with little sense of direction. And yet, at the same time, this impromptu 
decision-making, the retractable orders and obfuscated policies did have a very real 
effect: once the hotspot approach was in place, those who arrived on the islands were 
actually​ registered; European agencies ​did​ take over key functions otherwise revised for 
local and national authorities. We came to realise this was a certain type of ‘impromptu 
governance’, by which we mean a form of governance that takes form swiftly and even 
abruptly, while remaining tentatively retractable; a form of governance materialising at a 
certain, bound location​―​while its implications and impact are far-reaching. There is a 
10 The issue has also been picked up by relevant media outlets, see for example: 
http://newirin.irinnews.org/the-humanitarian-caste-system/  
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double paradox, then, at the heart of pop-up governance: swiftness in its introduction is 
met by potentially equal swiftness in its retractability; while certain geographical 
limitations to its application contrast the potentially unlimited scope of its impact. 
The ‘pop-up’ notion has been associated with foldable, flexible, temporary and mobile 
structures and conditions: starting from something perhaps as innocuous as festival tents, 
but nowadays extending all the way to temporary and mobile retailing (Warnabi and Shi 
2017), temporary urbanism (Ferreri 2015) and even flexible, interstitial and immersive 
geographies as a whole (Harris 2015): the ‘pop-up’ has in many ways come to be 
emblematic of a time when mobility and adaptability become equally paramount for 
survival―whether personal, collective or institutional. In response, we have made great 
inroads in understanding the process and cost of individuals, populations or businesses 
adapting to the demands of our times, from flexible labour (Strauss 2018) to camp 
geographies (Mould 2017). We recognise past models of governance are largely 
incapable of capturing, let alone responding to the fleeting nature of the present moment. 
And yet there is little progress in the study of how the structure and nature of governance 
is also changing as a result. We introduce ‘pop-up governance’ in an attempt to fill this 
conceptual gap.  We understand pop-up governance as a distinctive form of governmental 
response to a perceived crisis, emergency or event. While the precise configuration of 
agencies, processes and policies involved will vary depending on the objects of 
governance, we identify the following features as typical of pop-up governance in the 
case of Lesbos: 
 
1. It is narrowly focused on a specific problem or event. ​Throughout our 
elite interviews, a consistent theme was authorities’ need to prioritise 
dealing with the specific task-at-hand: “the priority of government”, told 
us a local authority coordinator (June 2017), “should first and foremost be 
decongestion of the island and fast tracking of the procedures”.  
2. It is spatially targeted, but with a scope to be replicated elsewhere 
with suitable adaptations. ​Authorities understood the challenge of a 
constantly volatile and flexible situation, and the subsequent need “to be 
agile and adaptable: as you know, routes change all the time”, told us a 
European Union representative on the island (December 2016). 
3. It is intended to be temporary, in the expectation that conventional 
governance will be restored once the problem has been controlled. 
Reception centres in Lesbos were always meant to be a temporary 
measure: “local society is opposed to the longer establishment of yet 
another reception centre”, claimed a national government representative 
elected in Lesbos. “Our effort is to appease the local society and assure 
them we will not be forever stigmatised by this event” (December 2016).  
4. It does not suspend normal governance and claims not to revoke 
rights.​ Unlike a ‘state of exception’, pop-up governance is meant to 
facilitate and expedite ‘normal’ governance and to supposedly enable the 
exercise of rights. “The problem is not with the procedures, the problem is 
how these are implemented​—​in other words, how fast” (local authority 
coordinator, June 2017).  
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5. It legitimates itself by claiming to fill a temporal and spatial gap in the 
capacity of governance.​ “We had to learn to work together [with our 
FRONTEX colleagues] in a very short time… We would not be able to 
patrol without them and these extra resources” (Greek coast guard, June 
2017). 
6. It is mobile in a two-fold sense:​ First, it aims to be a nimble-footed 
response to events as the emerge ‘on the ground’, and second, to then 
become capable of redeployment and replication. “We have trained EASO 
caseworkers who will be able in turn to train others as and when needed” 
(EASO spokesperson, December 2016). 
7. It involves reaction to unforeseen events.​ Unlike other forms of 
governing emergencies involving anticipation (Adey and Anderson, 
2011), pop-up governance highlights improvisation, rather than 
implementation of prepared plans. Here, impromptu synergies take shape: 
“when we cannot intercept dinghies headed to the rocky coast, we ask 
volunteers to help. Our boats are too large, so we often rely on volunteers’ 
smaller vessels”, told us a Greek Coast Guard officer (June 2017). And yet 
the vast majority of volunteers refused to cooperate with authorities, 
showing the tension in these new synergies. 
8. It may involve the formation of new spaces of governance.​ These 
include temporary command centres, people and information processing 
facilities, transport infrastructure and service provision: “one of our 
biggest challenges in setting up the Reception and Identification Centre 
was to establish personnel as coordination points and to interlink our 
databases” (Reception and Identification Service liaison, June 2017). 
 
In the following sections we reflect on some of these aspects of pop-up governance in 
relation to two key features of the management of migration in Lesbos: humanitarianism 
and security. 
 
4. The humanitarianism of pop-up governance 
Humanitarianism has been studied as a form of governance that sees the preservation of 
life as the highest moral imperative (Fassin  2012). Humanitarian governance is here 
understood both in relation to the ways in which it seeks to manage order populations by 
alleviating suffering and in its function as ordering chaos in order to be able to govern 
and alleviate suffering.. Walters (2012) was the first to note the transformation of 
territorial borders into spaces of humanitarian government. With his ‘humanitarian 
border’ notion, Walters tries to capture not a sequence of securitisation and 
humanitarianisation of the border but rather “the ways in which tactics and 
counter-tactics play themselves out at the molecular level” (Walters, 2012: 147). The 
invocation of humanitarian emergencies at borders legitimises forms of intervention by 
humanitarian actors sub-contracted by the state to perform a series of functions typically 
belonging to the remit of the state itself, particularly health care and welfare support. In 
biopolitical terms, the tension between security and humanitarian logics has been likened 
to an autoimmune disorder of the body (Vaughan-Williams, 2015), as “although border 
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security may appear to preserve life via humanitarian practices, it also threatens the same 
life it is supposed to protect” (2015: 119). In the case of the Mexico-US border, this has 
successfully resulted in the humanitarian militarisation of border enforcement through a 
dedicated state discourse that counters arguments about the violence of border 
enforcement (Williams, 2015). Variations in the intensity and tactics of this phenomenon 
have occurred elsewhere too. In both the EU and Australia, for example, discourses 
around saving lives by stopping boats have produced migrant subjectivities that become 
governable through the urgency to act in order to prevent more deaths (Little & 
Vaughan-Williams, 2016). But it is equally important to highlight the multiple ways in 
which humanitarian actors also become complicit in the production of governable 
population through ordering at the border. What our ethnographic research on Lesbos 
unveiled was that humanitarianism, as a central feature of the pop-up governance of 
migration, accomplished ordering through implementing systems of 
classification―which ultimately came to blur the lines between care and control. 
UNHCR’s map (​Figure 1​) points to such a classification and channeling 
mechanism set up by humanitarian actors and ultimately coordinated by UNHCR itself. 
Figure 1 Source: UNHCR and MapAction - image shared under a Creative Commons 3.0 
license. 
 
The registration and identification of migrants has long been a key objective of the EU’s 
border controls (Guild & Carrera 2013). In EU policy jargon, the process of registration 
and identification upon arrival at territorial entry points is commonly referred to as 
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‘screening’ or ‘first reception’. This is a bureaucratic procedure loaded with logistical and 
administrative obstacles. With almost 700,000 people crossing into and through Lesbos 
during the summer of 2015, this logistical challenge was simply too great for the existing 
Frontex and national police units. The UNHCR (UN’s refugee agency) came to fill in the 
gap by offering additional human resources and know-how in humanitarian border 
management. 
In August 2015, calling for a response equal to that mounted in humanitarian 
disasters,  ​the UNHCR identified two operational priorities: first, the strengthening of 11
Greece’s first-line reception capacity; and second, expedited access to the asylum system 
within the framework of the EU’s then nascent hotspot approach and relocation 
mechanism. The motivation behind the UNHCR’s emergency appeal was grounded in 
humanitarian concerns about overcrowding and congestion. The need to provide for 
orderly transit through the island was argued in conversations both at headquarters and 
among humanitarian personnel on the ground. In supporting the ‘decongestion’ of the 
island as an aid strategy, UNHCR advocated the need to speed up previous procedures 
for the identification and registration of new arrivals. 
The immediate challenge was transferring hundreds of thousands of refugees from 
the landing points on the north side of the island to the official registration sites on the 
east (see ​figure 1​). Besides humanitarian relief items and food, these individuals and 
families demanded reliable information and legal advice regarding their next steps. 
Humanitarian personnel recognized the limitations of an aid relief approach in the face of 
a moving population with high chances of being granted refugee status. In the words of 
one of the UNHCR emergency coordinators, “their needs are very different and our 
approach should be flexible; we must quickly adapt to the challenge” (interview with 
UNHCR protection officer, October 2015). 
Pallister-Wilkins (2019) describes the complications migrant mobility posed to 
humanitarian practice in Lesbos as a “form of ‘sticky’ triage” that is “based on the sorting 
of bodies according to suffering and need” (2019: 373). This sorting of migrant bodies 
adheres to logic and method of categorisation and classification according to their 
nationality and their ‘vulnerable’ classification. It takes place in a web of physical nodes 
en route from the landing points to the official registration centers south east of Lesbos. 
Known as transit points, they serve as in-between stations, spaces of assembly and traffic 
control, in which migrants are kept and discharged at regular intervals. We documented 
three core such spaces in the north of the island: transit point Mantamados, UNHCR 
transit camp in Skala Sikaminias and Club Oxy, just outside the village of Molyvos. We 
systematically observed practices of nationality and vulnerability assessment, carried out 
by humanitarian personnel along the transit route from the northern shores to the official 
registration points. Yet these practices also generate certain politics of space (Massey, 
2005): as the places where migrant triage happens, they must be understood in relation to 
places of registration elsewhere on the island. Together, they form a web of spatial 
ordering of migrant movement. 
11http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2015/8/55c48ea69/unhcr-warns-deepening-refugee-crisis-greece-calls-u
rgent-bold-action.html  
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From our interviews with humanitarian personnel we were informed that data 
collected in transit points served to prioritise certain nationalities and vulnerabilities, but 
also to refer migrants to the corresponding administrative procedures. Both nationality 
categorisation and vulnerability classification became a defining aspect of the 
implementation of the hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey statement (Authors, 2018). 
The humanitarian shift from sea rescues to decongesting the island made migrants 
more knowable in the process​―​and thus more governeable. In this way, the space of 
humanitarian border management was shaped by the imperative to properly identify 
nationality and prioritise according to vulnerability. While registration and border 
controls are firmly grounded in the notion of security, not all humanitarian action is at 
odds with security goals. Basaran (2014) employs the notion of humanitarianism under 
conditions of security in her discussion of the criminalisation of rescue in the central 
Mediterranean Sea. In modern liberal democracies, she argues, states seek to govern the 
humanitarian sentiment in the name of security. While states may discourage 
humanitarian rescue in the name of security, they are not opposed to humanitarian 
ordering. In the case of Lesbos, the humanitarian space which emerged there did not draw 
on the theme of preserving life through rescue, but rather, on creating a space where 
humanitarian action was warranted primarily as a response to an emergency–without 
disturbing the project of border controls. 
Ordering at the border space intensified as the pace of arrivals slowed down. With 
the official launch of the hotspot approach, the discourse shifted considerably from 
decongesting the island towards optimising identification and registration procedures and 
producing results. However, owing to the lack of EURODAC  ​registration equipment 12
and personnel, authorities resorted to a reorientation of existing resources. By November 
2015, Frontex had deployed 325 staff across Greek islands―87 of which were to support 
identification and registration on Lesbos, including through mobile registration units. 
Mobility between the two migrant camps, Kara Tepe and Moria, became restricted and 
fences reinforced. An informal campsite sprawled next to Moria, bearing witness to the 
real effects that the goal to identify, register, fingerprint and administratively process all 
those individuals at once had on the bodies and lives of transiting migrants. Already 
during the early months of its operation, the hotspot replicated conditions that 
humanitarian agencies were called upon to resolve in the first place. The humanitarianism 
of decongestion was designed to manage lives on the move; and while it made 
humanitarianism complicit with border control, it nonetheless operated under the 
principle of creating an environment where the delivery of care was possible. Under the 
hotspot approach, humanitarian actors became gradually restricted in their ability to 
provide relief. Meanwhile, the logic of categorisation by need and nationality had in turn 
been successfully incorporated into the architecture of the hotspot approach. 
 
5. Security practices in pop-up governance 
The discourse over security has long been argued to have shifted toward a diversified set 
12 During the 2015 crisis all new arrivals were required to be digitally fingerprinted but this was not always 
possible due to the lack of proper equipment, personnel and/or training on the islands, including Lesbos. 
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of practices (Cote-Boucher et al., 2014) owing to the varying and often contradictory 
aims of actors involved in policing borders today. Knowing what these actors actually do 
helps sustain a productive link between “complex relationships with security discourses, 
legal regimes and policies”, which in turn bring into closer view the nuances of 
contemporary bordering (2014: 196). In a similar vein, Bigo (2014) demonstrates how 
these practices of border control are embedded in the daily routines of surveillance 
professionals, military and security personnel. In the context of the EU’s maritime 
borders, humanitarian border security practices become legible in Frontex’s politics of 
rescue through interdiction (Moreno-Lax, 2018), as well as in the practices of legal 
exclusion (Basaran 2014). The peculiar presence of human rights and humanitarian ideals 
within border policing practices has been speculated to stem from a professional and 
personal understanding of duty to humanity (Jeandesboz and Pallister-Wilkins, 2016). 
Elsewhere, Jill Williams (2015) shows how the informal actions of care to injured 
migrants made by US border patrol officers have, through the years of stricter and 
securitised discourse, transformed Border Patrol protocols concerning interacting with 
migrants, leading to further criminalisation of humanitarian aid volunteers. 
The portrayal of migration as a security threat has been the subject of scholarly 
literature for sometime (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2000; Aradau 2004). We agree with the 
sociological approaches to security that consider security ​practices​ (such as the action of 
border guards and/or Frontex), not ​discourses​, to be strong securitisation indicators 
(Cote-Boucher et al. 2014). Within border zones, security practices result from ordinary 
law and exceptional politics alike (Basaran 2008). It is in the context of migration 
management under humanitarian border security (Vaughan-Williams, 2015) that the 
hotspot approach is justified and pop-up governance arrives. In this context, the mismatch 
between the migrants’ real-life experiences of border policies and the humanitarian 
rhetoric that accompanies them becomes an integral part of the current biopolitical 
governance of mobile populations (Little & Vaughan-Williams 2017).  
 
Crimes and non-crimes of assisted transportation  
The security practices of pop-up governance are characterised by the criminalisation of 
certain humanitarian activities under the premise of ‘anti-smuggling’ laws. Greece’s 
anti-human trafficking legislation prohibits individual and commercial vehicle owners 
from transporting individuals lacking proper identification. Yet migrants landing at the 
northern shores of Lesbos had to find a way to reach the registration centers, 68 
kilometers to the south. During the first months of 2015, individuals willing to help 
migrants by offering a lift in their private vehicles did so without interference from the 
police, but at their own risk. UNHCR-led advocacy efforts  resulted in an amendment of 13
this legislation in June that year. The ensuing exception from penalisation regarding 
transport assistance of those arriving was, however, authorised on the condition that it 
would serve migrants’ admission to legal procedures. This was essentially a reference to 
the administrative formalities regarding illegal entry and first reception. This exception 
was only permitted after competent authorities (the police or the coast guard) had been 
13 ​Statement of finding following field visits of the Greek Ombudsman to the islands of Kos, Leros, and 
Lesbos between 16-25/06/2015: ​http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/150727-stp.pdf  
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duly informed. In other words, transporting newcomers was only allowed by ‘exception’, 
and provided it actually facilitated the registration process. In practice, the 
implementation of this regulation was largely left to the discretion of the police and was 
further hampered by the inability or unwillingness of interested parties to access and 
inform the authorities. The exception was not extended to taxi drivers. As a result, the 
initial efforts including volunteer-organized convoys driving women, children, and the 
elderly to transit centres in Molyvos or Skala Sikaminias were quickly replaced by 
organised coach transport from transit centers and assembly points in the north, to the 
registration sites of Mytilene, implemented and funded by the International Rescue 
Committee, UNHCR and others.  
Transporting individuals from one side of the island to another does not amount to 
criminal smuggling in the eyes of the authorities at all times and legal provisions can 
develop and regress according to demand. These new practices of governing mobility on 
the island of Lesbos effectively decriminalised the transportation of persons, by making it 
work for the purpose of identification. It also distinguished between official humanitarian 
assistance and unofficial or voluntary acts of compassion, decriminalising the former 
while criminalising the latter​—​working towards “the potential of law to produce 
collective indifference” (Basaran 2015: 210). Several interviewees from civil society 
organisations reported intimidation by the police. The practice of compulsory registration 
of all activist and civil society organisations offering assistance and the gradual 
criminalisation of unofficial humanitarian assistance was based on the mantra of “central 
coordination” (interview with government MP, November 2015). On December 15, 2015, 
the Commission published an “implementation report” on the hotspot approach that 
requested the centralised coordination of relevant governmental and non-governmental 
players involved in the hotspot locations. As a result, police harassment and closure of 
squats and soup kitchens intensified. As Statewatch reported , the demand for central 14
coordination of humanitarian activities became inscribed in law as early as January 2016, 
less than six months after the launch of the hotspot approach. 
 
Experimenting with detention practices 
Prior to the inauguration of the hotspot (in October 2015) the Moria registration site was 
operated by Greek authorities in partnership with UNHCR. At the time, detention was 
limited to a hundred or so places in a small compound within the camp. Syrian nationals 
were registered in Kara Tepe and their nationality was quickly identified, as the majority 
were holding passports, thereby speeding up the process. After that date, registration 
routines were reorganised, and Kara Tepe no longer operated as a registration site. There 
were two separate sites for registration in Moria, a queue forming at the formal entrance 
where Syrian families waited to be registered, a second for Syrian men, Yemen and 
Somali nationals and a third at the side and at the back of the facility with Iraqi, Afghani 
and all remaining nationalities. Vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and single 
parents were prioritised regardless of their nationality. Registration queues were managed 
by the police and for the most part they seemed endless and stalling. During our frequent 
14 ​http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/eu-med-crisis-criminalising-civil-society.htm  
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visits, we had good opportunities for conversation. It did not take long for us to realise 
that getting at the front of the queue was a status attainable by several means―including 
aggression or payment. On another instance, in an effort to discipline those further down 
in the queue, a police officer picked out a male individual and assign them the role of 
‘peacekeeper’: an order manager in return for quicker registration. Along the queue of 
Afghan nationals, there were sometimes men carrying sticks (​ravdia​), handed to them by 
the police to use as a disciplining tool. This was understood to be a culturally appropriate 
form to crowd control in Moria since Afghani people, as one police officer put it, “obey 
the stick” (interview with police officer, December 2015). These otherwise uninformed 
views and improvised methods of crowd control by frontline personnel nevertheless 
contributed to security practices that were overall effective: the security apparatus 
expected the unexpected in terms of the conduct of this personel; or in other words, their 
uninformed views and impromptu and otherwise inappropriate methods were a perfect fit 
for a system of governance that was equally impromptu, a pop-up structure that could 
appear and vanish with ease. 
Yet these techniques generated feelings of arbitrariness and injustice to those 
waiting. They also became the precursor for the usage of more violent methods of crowd 
control, particularly when conditions in the hotspots deteriorated throughout 2016. For 
example, every shift change of the team of officers guarding the gates at the front of the 
queue, for which a police bus was needed, meant the dismantling of the queue​―​as the 
bus had to go through the queueing area. In the time it took the police bus to leave in a 
cloud of dust, people would rush back and struggle to get to their old place in the queue 
or fight to cut the line and get to the front. This eventually led to scuffles and riots, 
allowing the police to intervene using violent crackdown methods. 
The launch of Moria as a hotspot in October 2015 signified the gradual 
incorporation of a new management approach into the operations of the first reception 
centers. The prefabricated containers of the registration and identification centre were 
now surrounded by barbed wire fencing, typical of globalized detention center aesthetics 
(Flynn, 2017). The closed facility was now operated by the Greek Police, while 
registration and identification were managed by Ministerial and Frontex personnel inside. 
Behind these locked compounds, aside from the UNHCR and EU institutional 
representation, a certain number of local NGOs operationalised medical and 
interpretation activities as implementing partners. There were additional spaces reserved 
for unaccompanied minors, detained on the premise that they were in a vulnerable age 
and stood the risk of falling victim to unscrupulous smugglers and other criminal 
networks.  
The hotspot approach provided the pretext not only for expanding the 
infrastructure and the legislative grounds for detention  but also for introducing a 15
15 ​Art. 46 of Law 4375/2016 provides five grounds to detain migrants: 1) in order to determine his/her 
identity or nationality, 2) to “determine those elements on which the application for international protection 
is based which could not be obtained”, 3) in case “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
applicant is making the application for international protection merely in order to delay or frustrate the 
enforcement of a return decision” (return decisions are in practice broadly issued to new arrivals and 
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number of pilot detention programmes. In particular, our informants reported that 
sometime in December 2015 a new police verbal order was issued regarding the 
detention of nationals of North African countries in Greece. On our last visit at the end of 
2016, an informant working as a psychologist for detainees in the hotspot told us that the 
pilot project had been extended to all nationalities understood to have less than 25% 
recognition rate success. When Law 4375/2016 came into force, following the 
readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey, grounds for detention were 
expanded to include those believed to be applying for asylum for the purpose of avoiding 
removal. According to interviewees working as legal aid professionals in Lesbos, 
migrants often complained about being registered wrongly by Frontex as belonging to 
low-recognition rates nationalities. During the months leading to the EU-Turkey 
statement, Moria had gradually built its capacity as a pre-removal center. The rationality 
on detaining persons due to their nationality and recognition rate had become standard 
practice, despite the fact that the removal of those individuals within the three-month 
timeline was in virtually all cases impossible. The Moria pre-removal center was 
organised by different sections, according to nationality and ethnicity. With the 
implementation of the ‘hotspot approach’, and as envisaged in the readmission agreement 
between Greece and Turkey, the simple act of arriving on the island amounted to grounds 
for automatic detention. Virtually overnight, a new security regime popped up. This 
regime was based on the assumption that belonging to a nationality with a low rate in the 
recognition of asylum applications was prima facie evidence of an attempt to abuse the 
asylum system. Security practices reliant upon assumptions and statistical inference 
became a tool of governance that was now morally and legally legitimised through the 
work of security professionals in the hotspots. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We started our fieldwork on Lesbos thinking we were faced with an evidently large-scale 
version of a crisis of migration management, but with an equal sense that this crisis was 
not unprecedented​—​that it followed patterns found elsewhere in the past. In studying the 
Moria registration and detention camp, for example, we looked back at studies of 
reception camps and assembly points set up to fulfil border control and interim 
hospitality. These have been widely studied both as a technology of power and control 
and as a technology of care in the management of displacement in the global borderlands 
(e.g. Agier 2011; Hyndman 2008).  
Soon enough however, we realised that the role of humanitarian actors in EU 
border enforcement was crucial and new, and we looked at concurrent scholars attaining 
to this (Cuttita 2017; Pallister-Wilkins 2019; Stierl 2017). Our own field research 
unveiled the use of new spatial and temporal governance strategies in managing transit 
through the island. The humanitarian intervention which established the separation of 
protection-worthy subjects set the stage for the categorisation and channeling of 
incoming populations. This followed a logic deeply embedded in the international 
suspended or revoked for the duration of the asylum procedure), 4) if the person is considered as “a danger 
to national security or public order” or 5) to prevent the risk of absconding. 
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protection regime, as a mechanism of partition, identification and registration (Tazzioli 
and Garelli, 2018). Prior to the inauguration of the hotspot, registration processes shifted 
between the two main transit camps​—​Kara Tepe and Moria. Time of arrival played a key 
role in the administrative treatment of each individual, and nationality was used as a 
method of assessment of the legitimacy of their claim. Following the hotspot 
inauguration, and through the winter and spring months leading to the enforcement of the 
EU-Turkey statement, temporality and differential nationality treatment became the 
established model of management of the asylum process on the island. Those who arrived 
after the EU-Turkey statement fell into different procedural tracks than the ones already 
there. The applicants’ nationality was further encoded into the asylum procedure through 
differential treatment based on the statistical probability of different nationalities gaining 
international protection. These spatial strategies for the management and administration 
of the increased arrivals and population transit had already introduced and promoted the 
differentiation of individuals into protection categories and levels of vulnerability. Soon 
enough, they became institutionalised through the implementation of the hotspot 
approach. 
We witnessed that security practices were at the centre of attention in Lesbos, and 
we looked at previous works on migration and its association with questions of security 
(e.g. Basaran 2008; Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2000; Vaughan-Williams, 2015) to see if they 
could help shed light on the particular governance turn playing out in the island. In 
Lesbos, it was not always easy to discern between the humanitarian and the security 
practice. For example, assembly points and transit camps erected to manage the 
emergency were socio-spatial materialisations of the securitised border, a border that 
produced frequent emergencies in turn. Take for instance the deaths caused by attempts 
to warm up tents in Moria during the harsh winter of 2017. The emergency winterisation 
of the camp that ensued, by means of replacing tents with containers, temporarily 
appeased protests against the deadly effects of encampment. For quite some time, the 
practices of humanitarian professionals in their approach to ordering disorder on the 
island were directly aligned to the practice of security professionals tasked with policing 
the border. By the time the hotspot approach was launched, the securitised humanitarian 
space that emerged on the island molded even more into the needs of identification and 
registration, while humanitarian action became progressively marginalised.  
In our conversations with and observations of humanitarian and security 
professionals, we realised a new governance turn was under way, characterised by 
swiftness and geographical precision in the deployment of governance mechanisms in 
order to match a particular crisis: a certain type of pop-up governance was born on the 
island. This form of governance took form swiftly and abruptly―on the day of the 
EU-Turkey deal, and the ensuing inauguration of the European Commission hotspot 
approach approach in March 2016. This remained tentative and retractable throughout. 
Pop-up governance materialised at a certain, bound location―the island of Lesbos in our 
case―yet its implications and impact are far-reaching. Earlier in the paper we defined 
this as a double paradox, where swiftness in introduction were met by equal swiftness in 
retractability; and where geographical limitations contrasted with the potentially 
unlimited impact of pop-up governance. Just like its unlikely sibling from the retail 
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world, pop-up governance may also act as a very particular kind of an incubator: a trial 
run that, if and once successful, may be deployed elsewhere, at a larger scale. 
Some may argue that a flexible, time-limited and adaptable form of governance 
was the only realistic way forward for handling this unprecedented crisis. Undoubtedly, 
the arrival of around 400,000 individuals  over a short period of time presented 16
considerable logistical challenges for authorities. The assistance and know-how provided 
by humanitarian organisations may have indeed helped relieve the burden of managing an 
orderly transit through the island. The argument this paper is making is not against the 
necessity of measures and logistical solutions to assist refugees in a humane manner. At 
the same time however, the humanitarian solutions implemented on the island during this 
period were anchored on the tradition of containment and control, as embedded within 
the humanitarian government of populations around the world. What played out on 
Lesbos was yet another expression of the attempt of humanitarian agencies to adapt to the 
logic of the securitised border whilst at the same time enriching that very logic with 
processes of differentiation and categorisation. With the introduction of the EU-Turkey 
Statement (March 2016) and while humanitarian actors were pushed aside, processes of 
categorisation according to nationality intensified while protection standards went out of 
the window. The territory of the nation-state was split in two: different legislation and 
standards applied at the outer ‘hotspot’ edges than on the Greek mainland. In the long 
run, and due to delays in both returns and the relocation of applicants to other European 
countries, the island hotspots and mainland Greece have since turned into spaces of 
indefinite containment. Now, more than ever, the future of the European protection 
regime is at the mercy of European border controls. 
It is for these reasons that the ‘hotspot approach’ and the logic of pop-up 
governance  it represents are not simply an attempt to territorialise the governance of 
human mobility at the fringes of the state. They are also, and in many ways much more 
crucially, an attempt to make the governance of human populations mobile ​in itself​; to 
surpass the so-far dominant distinction between normalcy and the emergency by setting 
out geographically and chronologically finite models of governance that can nevertheless 
be replicated at will to meet demand―whether perceived or real.   It is also, and much 
more crucially, an attempt to make mobile the governance of human populations as a 
whole: that is, to alter the very essence of the state. The core principles of the ‘hotspot 
approach’ and its ensuing pop-up governance logic as these transpired in Lesbos point at 
a much more generalisable and generalised form of governance stemming from, and yet 
greatly surpassing isolated questions of humanitarianism, security, or indeed migration: 
the pop-up governance born in Lesbos points at a future direction for the governance of 
vulnerable populations and contemporary socio-political crises alike. 
 
  
16 ​https://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/5645ddbc6/greece-factsheet-lesvos-island.html 
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